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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a novel analysis of the classic “persistence of 
leadership” question, and applies it to a newly constructed dataset for 
Japanese manufacturing. The analysis rests on an appeal to an empirical 
“scaling relationship” between current market share and the variance of 
changes in market share. This relationship provides a powerful “model 
selection criterion” for candidate models of market share dynamics. It also 
makes it feasible, even in small datasets, to test directly for the properties of 
the “first passage times” corresponding to loss of leadership. 
Keywords: market share, industry dynamics, scaling, Japanese economy 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
For how long does a typical ‘market leader’ in an industry maintain its position?  This 
question has attracted continuing attention in the I.O. literature over the past generation.  
Two rival views have emerged.  The first, associated inter alia with Alfred Chandler 
(1990), asserts that leadership tends to persist for a ‘long’ time.  The rival view, 
sometimes labelled ‘Schumpeterian’, emphasises the transience of leadership positions; 
an explicit version of this view is spelt out in Franklin Fisher’s (1983), model of 
‘leapfrogging competition’. 
 
The central problem with this debate is that no benchmark is proposed relative to which 
the duration of leadership might be judged ‘long’ or ‘short’.  Thus, if it is observed that 
the typical market leader stays in place for 20 years this can be interpreted as ‘long’ by 
writers in the first group, and as ‘short’ by those in the second.  This point has not gone 
unnoticed by contributors to the literature; an unusually full and frank acknowledgement 
of the difficulty is set out by Mueller (1986),1 who notes that his conclusion as to the 
degree of persistence rests on a subjective judgement. 
 
This paper introduces a formal model of market share dynamics, and uses it to provide a 
benchmark case, corresponding to a ‘neutral’ situation in which neither positive 
(‘Chandleran’) effects or negative (‘Schumpeterian’) effects are present.  This model 
provides a natural benchmark against which empirically observed patterns of persistence 
can be gauged. 
 
 
1  Mueller’s study relates to profit rates, while the present paper relates to market shares; but the present 
point applies equally to both measures. 
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What degree of persistence should we expect on the basis of theory?  Game-theoretic 
models offer little guidance on this question.  The issue turns on the following 
consideration: suppose the market share gap between the leader and its (nearest) rival 
narrows, then will this induce an increase or a decrease in effort by the leader relative to 
the rival?  The factors that may influence outcomes here are numerous.   One 
(‘Chandlerian’) view emphasises the role played by the ‘dynamic capabilities’ of firms.  
On this view, market leadership is a correlate (‘signal’) of superior capability, which is a 
slowly changing attribute.  This suggests a story in which a short-run narrowing of the 
market share gap between leader and rival will tend to be followed by a reverse 
movement as the gap reverts to the level corresponding to the firm’s relative capabilities.  
Another important factor relates to the details of the underlying technology, as 
represented by a stochastic mapping from R&D to product quality.  If, for example, this 
mapping takes the (special) form used by Ericsson and Pakes (1995) for example, then 
the leading firm may find it optimal to cease investing in R&D (‘coasting’) even though 
this leads to a greater probability of being leapfrogged by its rival. 
 
Given the rival perspectives on the issues, how can we define a useful benchmark case?  
One way forward is to begin with the question:  if the gap between the leader and its 
(nearest) rival narrows, does this induce a tendency for a further narrowing, or a tendency 
for a widening?  The benchmark case proposed here is that in which neither of these 
tendencies is present; instead, market share dynamics follow a simple random walk (or 
first-order Markovian process).  Relative to this benchmark, we can consider two kinds of 
bias, one of which (‘Chandlerian’) leads to longer persistence of leadership, while the 
other (‘Schumpeterian’) leads to shorter persistence.2
 
2 The discussions of these two schools of thought in the literature do not admit of any sharper definition of 
their respective positions.  
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An idea that forms an important motivation for this exercise lies in the classic observation 
of Feller (1950), to the effect that passage times in Markovian processes tend to be 
extremely long relative to what we might expect intuitively.  Feller identifies this as the 
most surprising feature to emerge from the study of stochastic processes.  In the light of 
this, it seems natural to inquire into the degree of persistence that we would get in a 
simple Markovian model; for much of the discussion the literature pre-supposes that a 
‘long’ duration of leadership must imply that some ‘economically interesting’ mechanism 
is at work that accounts for this persistence.  What Feller’s insight suggests, is that 
looking for such explanations may be inappropriate.  Even if leader and laggard are 
equally lucky or equally capable, then we will still see leadership persist for what appears 
intuitively to be a ‘long’ time; and for reasons which are more a matter of arithmetic than 
economics. 
 
The idea that some kind of Markovian model might offer a useful first approximation in 
modelling market dynamics is not new; indeed, within the different but related ‘growth of 
firms’ literature it has a substantial history, beginning from the seminal contribution of 
Little (1962) and Little and Rayner (1966).3 Yet such models are often thought of as 
being unsatisfactory, on the grounds that they do not treat changes in firms’ shares as an 
outcome of strategic interactions (maximizing behaviour) in marketing, R&D, etc. but 
rather as the outcome of ‘stochastic shocks’.  Here, I defend the usefulness of such 
models on the following grounds: while traditional discussions between and among 
‘Chandlerians’ and Schumpeterians’ tacitly assume that there is some single mechanism 
driving (high or low) levels of persistence, the central message of the game-theoretic 
 
3 The ‘tests’ used in that literature have been based on examining correlations between growth rates over 
successive periods.  What is novel in the present paper, relative to that kind of representation, is the direct 
examination of the statistics of ‘first passage times’ (see below). 
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literature in this area is that we should not expect any single mechanism to play a 
dominant and systematic role in driving market share dynamics.  Many patterns of 
interaction may emerge between a leader and its rivals, and these patterns will reflect 
inter alia the beliefs of agents as to rivals’ likely responses to their actions.  The ‘beliefs 
of agents’ are among the several industry characteristics that may influence outcomes, 
but which are notoriously difficult to measure, proxy or control for in empirical studies 
(Harris (1994)).  This point is developed in Section 8 below, where we examine the 
pattern of market share dynamics in selected industries.  What emerges from these 
examples is: 
 
a) Very different patterns may arise across industries with apparently similar 
characteristics, 
b) Major shifts in the pattern of dynamics may occur within an industry over 
successive time periods.   
 
What this suggests is that, while it might be possible to build a satisfactory ‘structural’ 
model of market share dynamics for a single industry, or even a group of cognate 
industries, it is helpful in looking across the general run of industries to begin by 
examining the data against the background of a more modest, low level representation of 
the kind proposed here. 
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2.  The Main Idea 
 
The main idea underlying the method of analysis proposed here lies in exploiting two key 
features of the empirical data, which permit a very simple representation of the stochastic 
process driving the pattern of market shares. 
 
The analysis of market share dynamics poses, in general, two serious challenges.  First, 
since market shares add to unity, shocks to different firms’ shares are interdependent.  
Second, the (distribution of the) size of shocks to each firm’s share might be expected to 
depend inter alia on that firm’s current share.  This implies that an appropriate model 
might be one in which the distribution of shocks to each firm’s share would need to be 
conditioned on the full vector of market shares in the current period.  The role of the two 
empirical features of the data on which the present method of analysis rests is to permit a 
much simpler representation of the underlying stochastic process.   
 
The first feature of the data on which we rely is that, for all but four (highly concentrated) 
industries among the 45 industries in the dataset, the shocks to the market shares of the 
industry’s leading firms display an extremely low degree of correlation, so that we may 
impose, as a reasonable approximation, a model of ‘independent shocks’. 
 
The second feature of the data on which we rely is that it exhibits a simple ‘scaling 
relationship’ between a firm’s market share and the variance (or standard deviation) of its 
change in market share. 
The nature of this scaling relationship is as follows: the variance  of the change 2σ m∆ in 
a firm’s market share m, measured in percentage points, increases in direct proportion to 
m; equivalently, the standard deviation of the fractional change in m, i.e. falls 
proportionally with 
m/m, ∆
m/1 . 
 
The method of analysis used in what follows takes advantage of this feature of the data.  
Essentially, it allows us to characterize the size distribution of annual shocks to market 
shares within each industry by reference to a pooled sample of all observations (avoiding 
the need to condition directly on current market share, a procedure which would not be 
practicable using the ‘small’ dataset involved here). 
 
Taking these two features together, the most basic ‘persistence of leadership’ question, 
i.e. that of analysing the time elapsed until the market leader is overtaken by any specific 
rival, can be handled by reference to well-known properties of a (simple) random walk.  
By appealing  to the standard properties of first passage times for such processes, we can 
achieve a considerable simplification in the analysis.4
Before turning to empirical matters, it may be helpful to begin by setting out an 
illustrative theoretical model.  It is important to note, however, the empirical analysis 
which follows rests solely on a direct appeal to the two features of the data just 
                                                 
4 While the earlier literature has tested the null-hypothesis of ‘neutral’ or ‘first order Markovian’ property 
on which we focus below, it has done so by looking at (low-power) tests involving comparisons of 
.  A test of this standard kind for the present dataset indicates no significant correlation(s) of 
this kind, over any timescale. By focussing directly on the statistic of interest (the first passage time), we 
can arrive here at a more powerful and direct test of the hypothesis. 
1tt x and x +∆∆
 
7 
A more fundamental problem with the standard approach of examining changes in each firm’s sales as an  
(independent) stochastic process, as is done in the ‘growth of firms’ literature, is that  this approach is 
unsuited to examining the ‘persistence of leadership’ question: the counterhypothesis against  which the 
null is tested, is that the sales of each firm form independent higher order Markov processes.  However, the 
economically interesting counterhypothesis in the ‘persistence of leadership’ setting are ones in which 
changes in the sales, or shares, of the firms depend inter alia on the current difference in shares between the 
leader and its (nearest) rival(s), and this cannot be captured using the standard methods. 
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mentioned, and does not depend upon the particular model presented below.  The reason 
for introducing the model is to provide an intuitive explanation for three points which 
might otherwise seem puzzling.  These are: 
i. the idea that market share shocks may be ‘approximately independent’ in 
industries where concentration is low; 
ii. the scaling relationship  It is natural to ask whether this relationship has any 
theoretical basis. An examination of the various standard product 
differentiation models indicates that the only type of model that appears to 
exhibit this feature is a multi-product firm model that combines a vertical 
product attribute of the standard kind with a horizontal attribute of the 
locational (Hotelling) type.  In particular, this form of scaling relationship 
does not arise either in ‘single attribute’ quality models, whether of the 
‘vertical product differentiation’ type (Sutton (1991, 1998)) or of the 
‘stochastic quality jump’ type used by Ericson and Pakes (1995) in their 
model of market share dynamics.  Intuitively what drives the present scaling 
property is the idea that a large firm receives  shocks of the same absolute 
size,  but that the expected number of such shocks occurring in a given time 
interval increases in direct proportion to the firm’s size. In order to provide a 
framework for the analysis that follows, we begin by introducing a 
(deliberately simple) model of this kind. 
iii. The model introduced here is a non-strategic one in which changes in market 
shares are driven by exogenous shocks to product quality.  The motivation for 
introducing a non-strategic model in this context lies in the argument that the 
appropriate strategic model(s) would be highly industry specific, a point on 
which we elaborate in the final section below.  This raises the question: what 
9 
of strategic influences that do not depend on highly specific industry 
characteristics, but operate robustly across the general run of industries?  It is 
well known that certain systematic strategic effects operate to place a lower 
bound on the level of concentration that is sustainable as an industry 
equilibrium (for example, Sutton (1991, 1998).  How does this square with the 
notion that market shares may fluctuate over time, at least once some ‘lower 
bound’ to industry concentration is respected?  The point is addressed below 
(footnote 9). 
 
3.  A Model 
 
The model is a standard circular road model, in which firms offer products that are 
differentiated by ‘location’.  The products are located evenly around the circumference of 
a circle of unit diameter.  Each (active) firm owns a subset of these products.  For 
simplicity, we confine attention to the case where no  firm owns two adjacent products; 
this allows us to obtain a simple characterization of a Nash equilibrium in prices (it 
coincides with the price equilibrium for single product firms). 
 
We associate with each product a quality index u.  Consumers are located uniformly 
along the circle, the total size of the population of consumers being normalized to unity.  
Each consumer buys exactly one unit of one of the goods on offer, the supplier being 
chosen to maximize the consumer’s utility, 
 
U(p, u) = u – p –td 
 
where p is the price is the price of the chosen good and t is the (constant) unit cost of 
transport along the circle. 
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   1id − id idN/1 −  
p 1i1i u −− −  ii up −  1i1i up ++ −  
1idN/1 −−  
 
Figure 1 
 
In what follows, the range of u will be restricted so as to ensure that the ‘m
consumers’ defining the left and right hand boundaries of product i’s clientele 
between product i and its immediate neighbours.  We can then write down the con
defining the distance from firm i to the marginal consumer on its right, which w
, as follows: id
 
)dN/1(tuptdup i1i1iiii −++=++ ++  
[ t2/)uu()pp(N2/1d whence i1ii1ii ]−−−+= ++     (1)  
   
The distance from firm i to the marginal consumer on its left, denoted by 
Figure 1), is calculated in the same way, viz. 
dN/1 −
 arginal 
will lie 
ditions 
e label 
 (see 1i−
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][ t2/)uu()pp(N2/1dN/1 i1ii1i1i −−−+=− −−−     (2) 
 
 
Adding (1) and (2) we obtain the quantity sold by firm i, viz 
 
[ t2/)u2uu()p2pp(N/1q i1i1ii1i1ii ]−+−−++= −+−+     (3) 
 
Setting cost to zero and writing the profit of firm i as , we differentiate with respect 
to  to obtain the optimal reply (reaction function) of firm i, viz. 
iiqp
ip
 
( ) ( 4/u2uu4/ppN2/tp i1i1i1i1ii )−+−++= −+−+     (4) 
 
Given our assumptions that no firm owns two adjacent goods, and that the range of the 
quality index is restricted so as to ensure that the marginal consumer always lies between 
the product and its closest neighbour, it follows that the optimal reply (reaction function) 
for each firm is to set the price of each of its products in accordance with equation (4) i.e. 
the firm’s profit function is additively separable into a number of functions, 
corresponding to the profit earned from each product. 
 
In the special case where all the u’s are zero, the set of equations defined by (4) collapse 
to those of the standard circular road model: there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
prices, in which all firms set the same price p = t/N, as can be confirmed by inspection of 
(4). 
 
Our focus of interest lies in examining the manner in which exogenous shocks to 
(relative) quality levels of individual products impinge on the sales of the firm. 
 
It is shown in Appendix 1 that a unit shock to the quality of product i, given equilibrium 
price responses by all firms, leads to a rise in the quantity (sales volume) of  product i of 
3/1  units, and a fall in  the sales volume of each other product.  These impacts on the 
sales of other products decline geometrically as we move away from product i; for the k-
th product to the right or left of product i the change in sales volume is ( ) 3/32 k−− .  
Given our normalization of the total size of the population of consumers to unity, the 
(change in) quantity sold by a firm equals its (change in) volume market share.5
 
We do not restrict the pattern of shocks to qualities in what follows.  In each (short) 
period, there is a small probability p that a single shock to the quality of some one 
(randomly chosen) product occurs, the size of the shock being drawn from some 
distribution   This leads to a geometrically declining series of shocks to the 
product in question, and its neighbours.  We confine attention throughout the case where 
the number of products is large; and given the geometrically declining size of  impact, we 
approximate by neglecting all shocks beyond a certain radius viz. the product on the 
left to the product on the right. 
).u(f ∆
thl
thl
 
So far we have ignored the possibility that a shock to the quality of product k might bring 
it outside the range ]u,0[ .  We treat this by setting ,uuu if uu t1t ≥∆+=+  and 
.0uu if 0u t1t ≤∆+=+  
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5 We work for convenience in terms of volume market shares.  The results for market shares by value are 
similar, subject to an approximation. 
 When a product quality falls to 0, we treat this as an ‘exit’ event.6   We assume that such 
an event is followed by the entry of a new product by some firm, at initial quality 0.   The 
probability that the new product is entered by firm j is set equal to the proportion of 
products currently owned by firm j.7   
 
We will not be directly concerned in what follows with the long run steady state 
properties of the model;8 here, it suffices to remark that a firm’s expected market share, 
conditional on its having  out of N products, equals  jn .N/n j
 
 
We consider the impact on the pattern of market shares of a quality shock that affects a 
single randomly chosen product.  In what follows, we focus on the largest and second 
largest firm in the industry; their respective numbers of products are denoted as 
 and we denote by ,2211 pN/n and pN/n == 213 pp1p −−= the combined share of 
products owned by all other firms. 
 
                                                 
6 This representation of exit events is chosen purely for convenience; a more sophisticated model would 
involve a consideration of the sunk cost incurred in entering a product, and would involve the 
determination of an optimal threshold u* at which a product would be deleted. 
7 Again, this feature of the model is chosen in order to bring the model into line with the empirically 
observed ‘scaling’ property. 
8 In a model of this type, there will, once entry and exit are modelled as optimizing decisions, be a lower 
bound to the level of concentration (specifically, to the market share of the largest firm; see Sutton (1991, 
1998)).  This comes about as follows: suppose we allow firms to choose the quality of their products 
optimally, subject to some fixed cost schedule.  Then, if the number of firms becomes sufficiently large, so 
that the maximum market share falls below some critical level, it be optimal for one firm to deviate, either 
by raising the quality of (at least one) of its products, so as to capture a greater market share. 
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The idea behind the present model is that the number of firms that are active in the market has been arrived 
at by some earlier (unmodelled) process of entry, and it is not so large as to violate the ‘lower bound to 
concentration’.  The focus of interest here lies in asking, how do market shares fluctuate within the region 
permitted by these bounds? 
It is intuitively clear that, in examining the behaviour of the market share gap 21 mm −  
(or the gap which coincides with the expected value of ), that there are 
two polar cases of interest, viz. where  is large, so that firms 1 and 2 are ‘small’ and 
where  is close to zero, so that 
21 pp − 21 mm −
3p
3p 21 p1p −≅ .  In the latter case, there is close (negative) 
correlation between changes in the market shares of firm 1 and firm 2.  In the former 
case, this correlation is close to zero and we can approximate shocks to  by 
treating  and  as independent.  An empirical examination of the present dataset 
indicates that the correlation between 
21 mm −
1m 2m
1m∆  and 2m∆  is very close to zero (see Section 5 
below).  With this in mind, we focus on the case where  is large, where we may 
analyse the impact of a single unit shock to the quality of some randomly chosen good by 
representing the probability that firm 1 (or firm 2) receives the associated quantity shock 
of order k as  (or  respectively), and ignore all multiple events.  In this case, the 
expected change in  can be approximated as: 
3p
1p 2p
im
 
∑∑ =
k
kii
k
k spps  
 
where  is the change in quantity (volume market share) for a product deriving from a 
unit shock to the quality of a product at the k-th location to the right, or left associated 
with a shock of order k, and  is the share of products owned by firm I, and where the 
sum is taken over  
ks
ip
.,...,1,0,1,...,k ll −−=
 
Now consider any (discrete) distribution of quality shocks: let  denote the probability 
that a shock of size  occurs.  Then, recalling that the derived quantity changes are 
jf
j∆
14 
directly proportional to the size of the quality shocks, the variance of changes to  can 
be represented as 
im
 
( )
2
kj
j k
ji
2
kjj
j k
ii
)s(fp
)s(fpm var
∆=
∆=∆
∑∑
∑∑
 
Noting that the double sum in this last expression is a constant, the variance of  is 
proportional to  which we can proxy empirically by . 
im∆
,pi im
 
It follows that the standard deviation of changes to market shares satisfies 
 
( ) ii m.constant  m ≅∆σ  
 
It follows that, if we replace the market share  by im im , then for small changes we 
may write 
 
i
i
i mm2
1m ∆≅∆  
 
whence 
 
( )≅∆σ im  constant 
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so that we have a measure of volatility that is constant over .   We can now construct 
an industry-specific measure of the degree of volatility by pooling all observations of 
im
im∆  for all firms over some period; whence we define the volatility measure  
 
( )imvol ∆σ=  
 
In the case under consideration, where 1m∆  and 2m∆ are treated as independent, we may 
now proceed as follows.  Denote by ( )img ∆  the (symmetric) p.d.f. of  (small) changes 
to im .  Define the ‘gap’ between firm 1 and firm 2 as 
21 mmg ∆−∆≡  
 
Given the independence of changes to  we may model the evolution of g as a 
simple random walk whose increments are drawn from the distribution .  If the 
distribution of shocks to 
,m and m 21
gg o
1m  is, for example, normal with standard deviation , σ
then changes to 21 mm −  are normal with standard deviation σ=σ+σ 222 .  We 
can therefore normalize by defining the gap 
)m(.2
mm
g
i
21
σ
−=  
 
whose evolution can be modelled as a simple random walk, whose movements are drawn 
from the standard normal distribution N(0,1).  In the next section, we follow this 
procedure with one modification; the distribution of shocks is better represented as a t-
distribution, and we modify the procedure slightly to reflect this. 
16 
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4.  The Data 
with 
ne 
erger involving ‘leading’ firms occurs over the 25 year period in these 45 industries. 
 
 
The dataset consists of annual observations of market shares for leading firms in 45 
narrowly defined industries in Japanese manufacturing over the 25 year period 1974-
1999. (Appendix 2).  These data were compiled using the annual volumes published by 
Yano Company.  This source covers a large number of industries, but occasional changes 
in coverage and presentation occur, and it was possible to construct fairly long and 
consistent series only for these 45 industries.  Specifically, it was possible to compile a 
history of 23 years or longer for each of the 45 industries.  The starting data for this 
history is 1974 for the large majority of industries, but it is between 1975 and 1977 in a 
small number of cases.  The main tests described in the next section are carried out by 
reference to the 22-year history of these 45 industries.  A series of interviews 
selected companies was used to check issues of interpretation and reliability of data. 
Data of this kind would be very difficult to compile for a broad cross-section of industries 
in other countries; the availability of the Yano data was a primary reason for focussing on 
Japan.  The second, equally important, reason for this focus lies in the rarity of mergers 
and acquisitions.  For U.S. or U.K. data, for example, it  would be difficult to study the 
distribution of first passage times over an extended time period without having to 
confront the confounding influence of M&A events.  In the present data-set, only o
m
 
18 
he level of aggregation in this dataset corresponds roughly to the 5-digit SIC 
t 
e computation of first-passage times, since if one of these firms grows to become a 
leading supplier, it is incorpor no instances in which such a 
ed by the data. 
We be
 
a. 
 proceed to explore the full dataset using the model based on the 
first limiting case, as developed in the preceding section.  (Excluding these 4 
T
classification for the U.S.  The industries include, for example, margarine, photographic 
film, beer and cash registers. 
 
The number of firms included varies across industries, the typical case being half a dozen 
or so.  Excluded firms generally have very small shares.  Their exclusion does not affec
th
ated in the data-set.  There are 
‘newly entered’ firm overtakes the market leader during the period cover
 
5.  The Scaling Relationship 
gin with a descriptive account of some basic features of the data. 
We begin by taking the top two firms in some reference year (year 5), and we 
examine, which we label hereafter ‘firm 1’ and ‘firm 2’ respectively.  We examine 
the annual change in market share for firm 1, versus the change for firm 2, in each 
year.  The resulting scatter for the pooled sample of all industries is shown in panel 
(a) of figure 2.  The correlation  coefficient is 0.01, indicating that the data is well 
represented by the first limiting case described in the preceding section.  To 
explore this further, the exercise was repeated by excluding successive groups of 
industries, using as a criterion the combined market share of the top two firms in 
the reference year.  Only when the critical value of this combined market share 
was set to exclude all but 4 industries did a clear negative correlation appear.  With 
this in mind, we
19 
industries from the analysis which follows has no material effect on our 
 
b. 
of change  share, a poo
for m
conclusions).9  
To investigate the relationship between current market share, and the distribution 
s in market led sample of all annual observations was 
formed, and partitioned into groups (bands) by market share, i.e. all pairs 
which 1it mm +)m ,m( tt ∆  i ≤≤  fall in group i, and so on.  For each band, the 
standard deviation of tm ∆  was estimated.  Finally a regression of 
)m/m( n tt∆σl against tm nl  illustrated in Figure 3, yields a slope of –0.53, which 
is not significantly different to –1/2, and which suggests that the data is well 
c. ks to market
relationship to examine the distribution of 
represented by the first limiting case (as opposed to the second limiting case) of 
the model set out earlier.   
To investigate the distribution of the size of shoc  share (which is not 
restricted within the above model), we may take advantage of the scaling 
,m/m tt∆  which should be 
independent of .  This indicates that the distribution is represented by a t-
 about 1.3, i.e. of the form10 
tm
distribution with a coefficient of 3.12 )x1(
a
+
This is illustrated in Figure 4.  This description does not however e
)x(f = .  
xtend to the 
tails of the distribution; there are no observations outside a range of about 3 
standard deviations from the origin, a point to which we return below. 
                                                
 
 
9 It ight seem surprising prima facie that the lack of correlation holds even in moderately concentrated 
industries.  This may reflect the fact that, in some industries, the two leading firms do not compete ‘head-
m
to-head’, so that their gains (or losses) of market share impinge more on lower ranked firms, than on each 
other. 
10 By repeating this exercise for subsets of the data corresponding to different bands of mt, it is confirmed 
that the form of this distribution does not vary noticeably with mt , as expected. 
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Figure 2. The annual change in market share for the top ranking firm (horizontal 
axis) versus the change for the second ranking firm (vertical axis).  (The two firms 
are those ranked 1 and 2 in year 5 of the dataset).
Panel (a) shows the data for all 45 industries, while panels (b), (c) and (d) show 
data for those industries in which the combined market share of the top 2 firms in 
year 5 exceeded 50%, 80% and 90% respectively.
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in
 in what follows). 
analysis of  is two-fold.  First, we may take 
oblem to the study of 
a sim es.  
e for loss of 
d. Given the scaling property, it is natural to beg  the investigation of passage times 
by focussing attention on the top two firms, viz: we take some reference date 
0t0 =  and label firms in descending order of market share at that date.  We now 
examine the first date at which the market share of firm 2 exceeds that of firm 1 
(labelled 12t
 12tThe advantage of beginning with an 
advantage of the theoretical results developed above to reduce the pr
ple random walk, thus allowing us to draw some standard results for passage tim
Second, this allows us to place an upper bound on the passage tim
leadership.11
Figure 3:  The Scaling Relationship 
0
⎞⎛ ∆ MS21 
                                                
 
 
-2
 
11 It might seem natural to begin by checking whether changes in the market share gap between the two 
firms exhibit any (positive or negative) serial correlation over successive years.  A series of checks, using 
different time periods (lags), indicated no significant correlation of this kind.  This, however, does not 
exclude more subtle forms of departure from the null hypothesis explored here, as was noted in footnote 4 
above. 
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Figure 4.  The form of the distribution of 
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6.  Pa
This section looks at two methods of testing in relation to the passage time .  The 
tical model of Section 3 leads to an approximate representation in which 
12t
theore
21 mm −  can be modelled as a simple random walk in which the jump in value from t 
to    To control for the different 
le s 
 t+1 is represented by a draw from some distribution .gg o
vel of market share volatility across industries, we represent the gap as 
( ) σ/m 2 , where σ is an industry specific vo−m1 latility parameter. 
 
Our wa
begin by estimating the volatility  parameter 
y of predicting the distribution of the passage time 12t , therefore, would be to 
( )imσ  for each industry, and using this 
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estimate to ‘normalize’ the size of the initial gap ( )21 mm − .  To do this, we use the 
r some initial period [ ]t,0 to estimate 0data fo ( )i t the end of this 
period as the ‘initial gap’, and predict the probability for each industry of a crossing 
during the remaining time period 
mσ ; take the gap a
12t  
[ ]T,t0
industries to obtain a predicted number of crossings in these 45 industries over the period 
[ ]T,t0 . 
.   Finally, these probabilities are summed across 
 
The disadvantages of this method are: 
i. It ‘uses up’ several  years of data in estimating ( )im∆σ ; 
ii. Even if σ is constant over the entire period, the precision of the estimate obtained 
from some short initial period may be low.  
iii. It depends upon the empirically estimated form of 
 
( )imf harp 
n of this distr ution is possible, a difficulty
∆ .  While a s
characterizatio ib  lies in specifying the 
range of observations, i.e. the tails of the distribution.  Results may be sensitive to 
the specification used here, and this involves some arbitrariness. 
 
he first method of testing takes advantage of the properties of the simple random walk, 
This method was implemented using the first 5 years of data to estimate the industry 
specific volatility parameter σ .  However in view of problem (iii), the results are not 
reported here (they are broadly consistent with the results reported below).  Instead, two 
alternative methods are used, as follows: 
 
T
in order to avoid the need to estimate the volatility parameter. This property is as follows: 
let ot  be defined as the first date at which 1m  crosses 2m , so that the gap at this date 
equals (approximately) zero.  Now take the interval from ot  onwards.  Divide this into 
two equal sub-intervals, the second sub-interval being ( )[ ]T ,t1Tt oo −−  2/+  or 
[ ]1T,2/)tT(t 00 −−+  according as t is odd or even respectively. 
 
o
21 mm ∆−∆ 12t   follows a random walk, then the p obability that a crossing rIf the gap 
occurs during the second sub-interval equals 
2
.  This result holds independently of the 
distribution of shocks, and so of the volatility parameter.  The intuition is as follows: if 
we make the process more volatile, then the probability that the gap drifts upwards (or 
downwards) by a large amount during the first subinterval rises; but its probability of 
returning thereafter from a distant value increases to the same degree. 
 
We can interpret the null hypothesis being investigated here in terms of the circular road 
model of section 3: we infer from the equality of market shares at rate ot that the two 
firms have an equal number of products
1
 at that date (i.e. each has th e expected 
umber of products conditional on its observed share, viz, it owns a fraction  of the 
l’ defined above is 
½.  What if the hypothesis fails?  Say, for example, that firm 1 had some underlying 
 to 
e sam
imn
products).  The dynamics of market share then follows a random walk, with no (positive 
or negative) drift.  
 
Under this null hypothesis, it follows that, when we observe a crossing at time t0, the 
probability that we will observe a crossing in the ‘second sub-interva
‘capability’ superior to that of firm 2, and that this will make it (more) likely that firm 1 
will pull ahead, and stay ahead, of firm 2 in the future.  The presence of such a bias in 
favour of firm 1 would cause the stochastic process describing the market share gap
24 
25 
xhibit positive drift.  This is consistent with the presence of (a reduced number of) 
ed number of crossings in the 
econd sub-interval is now less than ½.12
test is that it re
industries out of 45.  The number of second period crossings in the set of 18 industries 
equals 5, as compared with an expected level of 9 under the null hypothesis.13  The null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level (one-tail test, see footnote 12).  
 
This suggests that, once a firm moves ahead of its rival(s), the degree of persistence of 
leadership may be greater than predicted under the null.   
 
Turning to the second method, we again appeal to the scaling property to justify the 
pooling of all observations of 
e
crossings of the firms’ market shares, but the observation of a crossing does not imply an 
equality between the firms’ future fortunes; the expect
s
 
The main disadvantage of this quires us to discard all industries in which 
no crossing occurs prior to the last two years of the data; this leaves us with only 18 
[ ]T,121 mm ∆−∆  for each industry for the full period , 
nd the modelling of the evolution of as a simple random walk.  Now, a 21 mm −
however, we use the set of pooled observations of 2m∆  for all firms and for all 
periods, within each industry, to predict the distribution of the first passage time for that 
                                                 
12 To see what is involved here, it is useful to ask what analogous argument would be for the gap in scores 
in a basketball game.  (I am grateful to Barry Nalebuff for suggesting this analogy.)  At time 0, the teams’ 
scores are equal, but the abilities of the teams will, in general, differ.  Only if abilities (scoring possibilities) 
are equal, does the present model apply.  If abilities differ, the gap in scores follows a random walk with 
(positive or negative) drift, and while scores may at some time(s) coincide, the probabilities of a second 
 4.8% under the
st
period crossing is less than ½..   
13 A deviation of 4 or more from the expected level of 9 will occur with probability  null 
hypothesis.  Thus we ju  fail to reject the null at the 5% level (2-tail text). 
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antage of this procedure is that it avoids the need to fit some distribution to the 
bservations of market share changes, and it allows us to focus directly on the issue of 
terest, i.e. whether the evolution of the market share gap exhibits some subtle form of 
ehaviour that distinguishes it from our Markovian benchmark. 
he results of the procedure are shown in Table 1 and Figure 5.  The predicted values, 
nd the associated 95% confidence interval, are obtained by simulating the random walk 
(Monte Carlo estimates). 
The results are shown for a series of alternative starting dates (year 0, 5, 10 and 15, 
pectively).15  The observed values show a tendency to lie below predicted values.  
ey lie within a 95% onfidence interval in two of the four case lling outside 
two. 
 
                                                
industry.  We then sum the probability of observing a crossing in each industry by time T 
in order to arrive at the expected number of crossings over our full set of industries.14
 
The adv
o
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b
 
T
a
 
res
Th  c s, while fa
in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 This procedure is equivalent, under our independence assumption, to modelling 21 mm ∆−∆  as a 
simple random walk. 
15 The results predicted values for these alternative starting dates were obtained by drawing market share 
shocks from the pooled sample for all periods.  The procedure was repeated suing the sample of shocks for 
the corresponding time period (period 6 to final period, etc.).  The results were closely similar to those 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Predicted number of crossings 
 
 
 
Years after initial 
year (year 5) 
 
Actual number of 
crossings 
Mean 95% Confidence 
Interval 
1 4 2.6 0.2 - 6.0 
2 4 4.5 1.0 - 8.3 
3 6 5.9 2.0 - 9.2 
4 8 7.1 2.9 - 10.7 
5 9 8.2 3.7 – 11.9 
6 9 9.1 4.5 – 13.0 
7 9 10.0 5.2 – 14.0 
8 10 10.8 6.0 – 14.9 
9 10 11.5 6.5 – 15.7 
10 10 12.1 7.1 – 16.4 
11 11 12.7 7.6 – 17.0 
12 11 13.3 8.2 – 17.6 
13 11 13.8 8.6 – 18.0 
14 11 14.3 9.1 – 18.6 
15 11 14.7 9.4 – 18.9 
 
Table 1  Actual and Predicted Crossing Times for the Two Leading Firms, over  
               45 Industries. 
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Two-firm First Crossing Times (as of year 6)
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Figure 5  The top panel shows the number of crossing of the leading firm by its closest rival in the initial 
period, by elapsed time t that occur within the 45 industries.  The second, third and fourth panels repeat this 
exercise, beginning from the sixth, eleventh and sixteenth year of the 23-year run.  (The ‘closest rival’ is 
defined as the second largest firm in the corresponding initial year).  The expected number of crossings, 
and the confidence interval, for our benchmark process are also shown. 
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Figure 6  The top panel shows the number of crossings of the leading firm by any rival, by elapsed time t, 
that occur within the 45 industries.  The lower panel shows the results for the 41-industry dataset in which 
4 ‘highly concentrated’ industries are omitted. 
 
 
7.  Passage Times II 
 
The analysis can be extended from the study of crossing times of the form  to the 
study of general crossing times (i.e. the initial leader is overtaken by any firm).  Here, the 
reduction of the problem to one in which the distribution of crossing times is determined 
by a single number (‘normalized gap’) as no longer possible.  We need instead to specify 
the full vector of initial market shares, and the volatility parameter for the industry.  
Monte Carlo estimates were constructed in this way, which specify the probability of any 
crossing during the interval [1, 22], and the probabilities were summed, as before, over 
12t
29 
30 
industries to obtain an expected number of crossings.  The results are shown in the top 
panel of Figure 6.  Most crossings are, in practice, made by the second largest firm in the 
industry, and the results shown in Figure 6 are closely similar to those shown in the 
corresponding (top) panel of Figure 5. 
 
It was noted above that the assumption of independence underlying the null hypothesis is 
invalid for the four most highly concentrated industries in the dataset.  With this in mind, 
the exercise was repeated using the remaining 41 industries only.  The results are shown 
in the lower panel of Figure 6, and are closely similar to those shown in the upper panel.  
(No crossings occur in these 4 industries, and they all feature a large initial gap in shares, 
and low volatility, so that the expected number of crossings under the null hypothesis is 
close to zero). 
 
The overall conclusion is that there appears to be a tendency for fewer crossings (longer 
persistence of leadership) than predicted by the benchmark model.  This observation 
raises an obvious question: could this tendency to be driven by some systematic 
(strategic) mechanism that operates across the general run of industries?  Is there some 
‘Chandlerian’ mechanism at work, for example, which could be interpreted by saying that 
current annual market shares are not a ‘sufficient statistic’ for the (superior) level of 
capability employed by (leading) firms?  Or, on the other hand, does this tendency merely 
represent the overall average behaviour of a series of industries, each driven by its own 
idiosyncratic features?  To investigate these questions, we turn to some case studies of 
industries in the sample. 
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8.  Digging Deeper 
 
A central argument of the present paper is that any simple stochastic model can easily be 
bettered as a representation of any one industry, by  incorporating industry-specific 
features which will include a strategic representation of firms’ competitive responses to 
market share changes.  Once we aim at constructing a ‘richer’ model of this kind, 
however, we meet the problem that ‘strategic effects’ will turn on various features, some 
of which are intrinsically ‘unobservable’ as far as the outside economist is concerned.   
 
A more sophisticated model would retain exogenous shocks to underlying ‘technology 
and tastes’ parameters, but would extend firm’s reactions beyond the price-quantity 
adjustments allowed for above, to deal with changes in marketing and/or R&D outlays 
aimed at raising (perceived) quality, and with the entry and exit of products.  It is in 
respect of these latter adjustments that subtle differences appear across different 
industries, which seem to be driven by various factors, some of which are very difficult to 
measure, proxy or control for in empirical studies.  Most importantly in the present 
context, they include the beliefs of agents as to their rivals’ private information, and 
strategic responses.   
 
In considering a model that allows for strategic responses on the marketing or R&D side, 
the key question of interest is: how do these strategic responses impinge on the degree of 
volatility of market shares, and on the evolution of shares over time? 
 
One obvious factor that might impinge on market share volatility is the degree to which 
existing products are displaced by new products.  We begin with two industries in which 
the rate of product displacement was very high, but in which market share patterns were 
very different. 
 
In the cash register industry, the technology changed continuously and dramatically over 
the 25-year period, as free-standing electromagnetic registers were first replaced by 
electronic types, and as these electronic types were in turn displaced by store-wide or 
company-wide computer  
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igure 4(a).  Market Shares 
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Figure 4(c).  Market Shares 
   
linked networks.  The market share pattern was extremely volatile, as successive firms 
gained a relative technical advantage. (Figure 4(a)) 
 
A contrasting pattern arises in the margarine industry.  Here, the industry was 
characterized (perhaps surprisingly) by a very rapid rate of introduction of new varieties 
(one manufacturer’s 1990 brochure contained scores of varieties, which differed in form 
of packaging, choice of flavouring, hardness and texture, etc.).  In spite of the high degree 
of new product introductions, market shares remained remarkably stable, as each 
successful innovation by any firm was immediately countered with a response by rivals, 
who quickly imitated successful products. 
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als were slow to respond, and ‘Asahi Dry’ propelled the 
Asahi company to second place in the industry.  (The market leader Kirin eventually 
imitated this strategy by marketing its ‘Kirin Dry’ product, whose sales remained below 
those of ‘Asahi Dry’ over the next decade).  The question raised by this is: if we 
constructed a ‘fully specified, strategic model’ of the Japanese beer market, what 
variables accessible to the researcher could have predicted the non-impact of the 
packaging wars, as against the substantial impact of the ‘Dry beers’ marketing campaign?  
It would seem that the speed and effectiveness of rivals’ responses differed in the two 
cases because of different beliefs on the part of rivals’ as to the probable effectiveness of 
the innovator’s strategy.  What this suggests is that, just as the literature on dynamic 
oligopoly suggests, the size of the market share response, and so the level of market share 
volatility in the industry, will depend inter alia on the beliefs of agents – a factor that we 
must perforce treat as an unobservable in most settings. 
 
One interpretation of the different outcomes in these two industries lies in the different 
strategic responses of firms to rivals’ successes.  This difference might, however, simp
reflect differences in the ease with which innovations can be imitated by rivals.  To 
explore this latter idea, it is interesting to look at the evolution of market shares in the 
beer industry.  Here, there are two periods of interest.  The late 1970s was marked by 
what came to be known in the industry as the ‘packaging wars’.  Firms vied with each 
other in introducing new forms of packaging (bottles and cans of new sizes; plastic 
containers in odd and unusual shapes, and so on).  Throughout this period, market shares 
remained quite stable.  The second period is the 1980s, when a beer was marketed by the 
Asahi company, then the industry’s fourth largest firm, under the name ‘Asahi Dry’. 
Despite its initial success, riv
37 
hat I want to suggest, then, is that while differences in firms’ strategic responses to 
vals’ actions may be one of the factors that account for the different patterns of 
 
consider the market for pocket calculators, an industry that 
s marked, like the photocopiers and colour film industries, by a fast rate of technical 
hares increased steadily, and in step, 
s the shares of all the smaller firms declined.  It is easy to specify a suitable game 
W
ri
evolution of shares in different industries, these differences in strategic responses will 
depend delicately on factors that are difficult to account for on the basis of stable and 
observable ‘industry characteristics’.  To illustrate this point, it is of interest to consider 
two industries which display quite different patterns of market share dynamics at 
different periods.  The photocopier industry, for example, offers an example in which a 
technically innovative follower (the third firm in 1974) gradually overtakes the leader; 
but the industry then moves to a stable setting for 15 years, with the innovator sharing 
first place with the original market leader. (Figure 4(b)).  In the colour film market, there 
are again two phases; over the decade, the market leader’s share rises at the expense of its 
nearest rival, but then shares stabilize and show little volatility over the next 15 years. 
(Figure 4(c)). 
 
In contrast to these two cases, 
wa
innovation and new product introductions. (Figure (4(c)). Here, the top two firms 
escalated their innovatory activities and both their s
a
theoretic model which has these features (see for example, Sutton (1991), Chapter 5); but 
it is not clear what observable ‘industry characteristics’ for 1974 could have predicted 
that this industry’s market share pattern would have differed in this way from those seen 
in photocopiers or colour film – beyond attributing it to different ‘stochastic realizations’ 
of outcomes to the different firms’ early innovatory efforts, and arguing that the initial 
‘accidental’ successes induced different strategic choices thereafter.   
38 
e, proxy or control for in cross-
 
These examples, taken together, suggest a serious caveat regarding the traditional 
‘persistence of leadership’ debate.  That debate has been conducted on the premise that 
there might be some general mechanism(s), either of a ‘Schumpeterian’ or ‘Chandlerian’ 
kind, that operate(s) across the general run of industries.  What these examples suggest is 
that there are many mechanisms, some operating in one direction, others in another 
direction, so that when we test for some ‘bias’ in either direction we are (at best) 
assessing some kind of average outcome that will be highly sensitive to our selection of 
industries.  It is in this (rather cautious) spirit that any conclusions as to a possible 
‘Chandlerian’ bias in the present set of Japanese industries should be drawn. 
 
9.  Conclusions 
 
This paper makes three points.  The first relates to the limitations of game theoretic 
(strategic) models.  The second relates to the use of scaling relationships for the variance 
of firm growth rates, and market shares.  The third relates to the ‘persistence of 
leadership’ debate. 
 
a.  Game Theoretic Models 
 
I have argued elsewhere (Sutton (1991, 1998)) that game theoretic models can lead us to 
a small number of robust predictions, which allow us to place limited restrictions 
(bounds) on market structure.  Beyond these few robust results, however, outcomes will 
depend delicately on factors that are difficult to measur
39 
ing-time problem addressed here to be reduced to the study of a simple 
ndom walk. 
industry studies.  In this setting, it can be of interest to examine ‘low-level’ 
representations of the data, of the kind attempted here. 
 
b.  Scaling Relationships 
 
The recent literature regarding scaling relationships on firm growth rates, has focussed on 
the description of relationships, and on differences in views as to candidate explanations 
for such relationships (Stanley et al. (1996), Sutton (2002)).  Little attention has been 
paid to the question of whether the characterization of such relationships is empirically 
useful.  In this paper, I have argued that the characterization of a simple scaling 
relationship between a firm’s market share and the variance of changes in market share, 
permits a useful simplification in the description of market share dynamics, allowing the 
(limited) cross
ra
 
This scaling relationship also provides a useful criteria for model selection in the area of 
market share dynamics, as it is a feature of only one of the several standard models in the 
current economics literature.16
 
c.  The persistence of ‘leadership’ problem 
 
The claim of this paper in regard to the ‘persistence of leadership’ debate is a modest one.  
We explore the properties of a benchmark model in which there is no systematic bias, 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting, however, that it is also consistent with certain models, popular in the marketing 
literature, in which individual consumers are attached to firms over successive p
consumer has a (small) probability of shifting allegiance to a new firm in any pe
eriods, but where each 
riod. These models are 
purely statistical in nature, and do not rest on optimising by agents. For a model of this type based on 
maximizing behaviour by firms and consumers, see Sutton (1980). 
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hether of a ‘Chandlerian’ or ‘Schumpeterian’ kind, present.   Such a model is consistent 
of Japanese 
anufacturing industries.  This paper makes no claims in this regard.  It would 
nonetheless be of some interest to see whether a similar pattern holds good for the 
general run of manufacturing industries in other countries.17
                                                
w
with a degree of persistence of leadership that might seem to be rather ‘long’ on the basis 
of intuition (Feller (1950)).  The empirical evidence for the Japanese industries examined 
here is such as to suggest a degree of persistence that is somewhat in excess of that 
predicted under this benchmark model.  This raises the question of whether there is any 
single systematic influence at work in driving this persistence. An examination of the 
drivers of market share changes in different industries, suggests that there is no single, 
systematic effect at work here.  Rather, what we seem to be observing is an average over 
this sample of industries, of various industry specific mechanisms.  Thus, we might or 
might not find that this pattern persists over a different or broader sample 
m
 
author’s original reaction, five years ago; but now having expanded the range of industries to all those for 
which satisfactory data can be assembled and having added 5 years of data,  I have decided to report the 
results at this point. 
 
17 It might strike the reader that extending the data set to more industries and/or  waiting for more data to 
accumulate for the present Japanese dataset might allow a sharper conclusion to be drawn.  This was the 
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Appendix 1 
Calculating the impact of a quality shock 
 
We may take advantage of the fact that the system of equations (4) in the main text is 
linear in the   jj u and p to deduce that a unit change in iu  will affect equilibrium prices 
,...p ,p ,p ,p ,p  by a constant amount, independently of the initial vector of 
qualities.  Hence we may ease the notional burden in what follows by  taking as a point of 
reference the case where all the  are initially zero, and all prices are equal to t/N.  We 
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now consider the impact on equilibrium prices of a unit rise in the quality of some one 
good holding all other qualities constant. 
 
We will confine analysis in what follows to the case where the total number of products 
is odd (the even case can be treated similarly).  Label the good whose quality has risen as 
good 0, its k-th neighbour to the right as good k, and k-th neighbour to the left as good –
k.  Denote the total number of products by 2n+1; we then have that the index k runs from 
1 to n, and good n has right hand neighbour –n.  We denote the deviation of the quality-
adjusted price )up( jj −  from its initial level t/N by )up( x viz,x jjjj −∆= . We have 
from the symmetry of equation (4) that the equilibrium price deviations satisfy jj xx −=  
for all j = 1, 2, , n.  It therefore follows from (4) on writing 0u,1u j0 =∆=∆  for all j = 1, 
2, … n that the deviations in quality-adjusted prices  must satisfy the equations: jx
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Figure A1:  Labelling the Products 
Now from symmetry, 
e convention that nn xx ≡−  (Figure A1).  Now jx
changes for goods ±1, ±2, …, n ; but for good 0, whose quality has risen by 1 unit, the 
change in price equals 0x1− . 
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)1n(1n xx −−− =  so (A3) implies that  
 
1nn x2
1x −=         (A4) 
 
while (A2) implies 
 
2nn1n xxx4 −− +=        (A5) 
 
 
 
Using (A4) to substitute for  in (A5) and solving we have nx
)n(n −≡  
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Using (A6) to substitute for 
 
We may now proceed iteratively 
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1nx −  we obtain 
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For any given n, we may solve 
4
x −−
−
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for the  by combining the relation between 
 derived in this manner with (A1).  Take for example the case n = 3.  
 ix
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There are 6 products labelled 0, ± 1, ± 2, 3.  Equation (A7) implies that 
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while from (A1) we have 
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whence using (A7), (A6) and (A4) we obtain 
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In the limit , the recursion relation illustrated by (A6), (A7) above 
beco
 
→n ∞
mes 
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Solving for the repeated fraction we obtain 
 
1inin x)32(x −−− −=        (A8) 
 
so that the changes decline geometrically as we move away from , each change 
pper’) neighbour. 
Setting i = n
 0x
being about one-third as big as its (‘u
 
 - 1 in we have 
 
( ) 01 x32 −=        (A8) 
ombining this with (A1) we obtain: 
x
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( ) ,...
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We may interpret this intuitively as follows. Recall that 
k
 
( ) .1pupx 0000 −∆=−∆=   A he quality os t f product zero rises by 1 unit, its price 
3
11−  units, so that its quality-adjusted price falls by rises by 
3
1  units.  There 
is a fall in the prices of all other products, the size of this change falling off 
eometrically as we move away from good zero. 
 
To find the changes in quanti
1010 uppxxq
g
ties, we note that it follows from inspection of the 
demand function (equation (4) of the main text) that 
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hence we obtain, on substituting for the , that 
 
w sx j
3
11
3
1
3
32qo −=+−−=∆  
 ( ) 1ifor   32
3
1qq iii ≥−−=∆=∆ −  
 
It follows that the sales, and so the (volume) market share of good 0 rises, while 
that of all other goods fall, the size of the fall decreasing geometrically as we 
move away from good 0. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Industries in the Dataset 
1 Sugar 
2 Frozen Food 
3 
4 Instan
5 Chocolate 
6 Chewing Gum 
7 Cola 
8 Beer 
9 Womens Clothing 
10 Adhesives 
11 
12 Toothpaste 
13 
14 Elevators 
15 Escalators 
16 Tin Cans 
17 
18 Oil Stoves 
19 
20 Airconditioner (Package) 
21 Cash Registers 
22 English Typewriters 
23 Pocket Calculators 
24 Photocopiers 
25 Refrigerators 
26 Washing Machines 
27 Vacuum Cleaners 
28 Colour TVs 
29 Cars 
30 Buses 
31 Trucks 
32 Motorcycles 
33 Optical Measuring Equipment 
34 Analytical Equipment 
35 Length and Precision Measuring Equipment 
36 Electric Meters 
37 Gas Meters 
38 
39 35mm Cameras  
40 pare Lenses for Cameras 
41 Black and White Film 
42 Colour Film 
43 Pencils 
44 Fountain Pens 
45 Ball Point Pens 
Regular Coffee 
t Coffee 
Bath Soap 
Car Tyres/Tubes 
Gas Stoves 
Airconditioner (Window) 
Water Meters 
S
